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Management Options and Restricted Stock: Valuation Effects and Consequences 
 In the last decade, firms have increasingly turned to offering employees options 
and restricted stock (often with restrictions on trading) as part of compensation packages. 
Some of this trend can be attributed to the entry of young, cash poor technology firms 
into the market, many of which have to use equity because they have no choice. 
However, many larger market cap firms that can afford to pay cash compensation have 
used stock based compensation as a way of aligning managerial interests with 
stockholder interests. In this paper, we begin by looking at motives, good and bad, for 
using equity based compensation, and trends over the last few years. We then turn to the 
accounting rules, old and new, that govern how equity compensation is recorded and 
reported. Finally, we consider how best to incorporate employee options and restricted 
stock – both past and prospective – into discounted cash flow and relative valuation 
models. 
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 In recent years, many firms have shifted towards equity-based compensation for 
their employees. It is not uncommon for firms to grant millions of options annually not 
only to top managers but also to lower level employees. These options create a 
potentially value decreasing overhang over common stock values. What used to be a 
simple practice of dividing the estimated equity value by the number of shares 
outstanding to arrive at value per share has become a daunting exercise. Analysts struggle 
with how best to adjust the number of shares outstanding (and the value per share) for the 
possibility that there will be more shares outstanding in the future. They attempt to 
capture this dilution effect by using the partially diluted or fully diluted number of shares 
outstanding in the company. As we will see in this paper, these approaches often yield 
misleading estimates of value per share and we propose a sounder way of dealing with 
employee options. 
We also explore other forms of equity compensation, including the use of restricted 
and unrestricted stock grants to management, and the effects of such grants on value per 
share.  Like options, these stock grants reduce the value of equity to existing stockholders 
and have to be considered in valuation. 
Equity Based Compensation 
 There are three forms of equity compensation. The oldest and most established 
one is to give stock or equity in the firm to management, employees or other parties as 
compensation. This second is a variant, with common stock and equity grants to 
employees, with the restriction that these shares cannot be claimed and/or traded for a 
period after the grants. The third is equity options, allowing employees to buy stock in 
the firm at a specified price over a period; these usually come with restrictions as well. 
 In recent decades, equity-based compensation has become a bigger part of overall 
employee compensation, initially at U.S. firms and more recently in other markets as 
well. There are three major factors behind this trend: 
1. Stockholder-Manager Alignment: As publicly traded firms have matured and become 
larger, the interests of stockholders (who own these firms) and managers (who run 
these firms) have diverged. The resulting agency costs have been explored widely in 
the literature. In a seminal work, Jensen and Meckling argue that managers, acting in 
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their best interests, often take actions that destroy stockholder value.1 Researchers 
have shown that managers, left to their own devices, accumulate too much cash, 
borrow too little and make poor investments and acquisitions.  Offering equity in the 
firm to managers may reduce the agency problem by making managers think more 
like stockholders.   
2. Scarcity of Cash: The shift towards equity compensation was most pronounced at 
technology firms in the United States. In particular, young technology firms entered 
the market in droves in the 1990s, many with little to report in terms of revenues or 
earnings. Given their cash constraints, the only way in which these firms could attract 
and hold on to employees was by offering them non-cash compensation, usually with 
the only currency of value that they had which was their own equity.   
3. Employee Retention: Most equity compensation comes with a requirement that the 
employee stay with the firm for a period of time (the vesting period) to lay claim to 
the compensation. Employees who receive options or restricted stock as 
compensation are therefore more likely to stay with a firm, especially if it represents a 
large proportion of their overall wealth.2 
4. Accounting and Tax Treatment: The move towards equity compensation has been 
aided and abetted by accounting standards that have treated firms that use equity 
based compensation much more generously (by reporting higher earnings) than firms 
that use cash based compensation, and by tax laws that provide tax benefits to firms 
that used options to reward employees. 
Of the three forms of equity compensation, the use of common stock represents the 
fewest problems from a valuation perspective. The value of the stock grant is treated as a 
compensation expense (when the grant is made) and the number of shares increases in the 
firm. Stock option grants and restricted stock create more difficult issues for analysts, 
                                                
1 Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
2 An additional advantage of using equity options to compensate employees is that their value is likely to 
be highest when the sector is doing well and alternative job opportunities are greatest for employees. Thus, 
the cost of switching jobs will be greatest when the opportunity to do so is highest. For a more extensive 
discussion of this motive and some empirical evidence, see P. Oyers and S. Schaefer, 2004, Why Do Some 
Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees? An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, Journal of 
Financial Economics, v75, pg 99-132. 
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both in terms of measuring earnings in any period and in coming up with values per 
share. In the sections that follow, we will first look at equity options and then turn our 
attention to restricted stock issues. 
I. Employee Options 
Firms use equity options to reward managers as well as other employees. There 
are two effects that these options have on value per share. One is created by options that 
have already been granted. These options, some of which have exercise value today, 
reduce the value of equity per share, since a portion of the existing equity in the firm has 
to be set aside to meet these eventual option exercises. The other is the likelihood that 
these firms will use options on a continuing basis to reward employees or to compensate 
them. These expected option grants reduce the portion of the expected future cash flows 
that accrue to existing stockholders and thus the value per share today. In the sections that 
follow, we will begin by looking at trends in the use of employee stock options and the 
types of firms where option grants are largest. We will also examine the characteristics of 
employee options and how they have been accounted for historically. We will close the 
section by revisiting the debate on whether employee stock options should be expensed 
and the new accounting rules that will govern option grants. 
The Magnitude of the Option Overhang 
 The use of options in management compensation packages is not new to firms. 
Many firms in the 1970s and 1980s initiated option-based compensation packages to 
induce top managers to think more like stockholders. What is different about the more 
recent option grants, especially at technology firms? One is that management contracts at 
these firms are much more heavily weighted towards options than are those at other 
firms. The second is that the paucity of cash at these firms has meant that options are 
granted not just to top managers, but also to employees all through the organization, 
making the total option grants much larger. The third is that some of the smaller firms 
have used options as currency to meet operating expenses and pay for supplies. 
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Market Wide Trends 
 There are a number of different statistics that we can point to that show the 
growth in equity option compensation. The simplest measure is the number of employee 
options outstanding as a percent of the total outstanding shares, also called the option 
overhang. The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), an independent watch 
dog for shareholders, estimated that the overhang was 17% for the 1500 companies it 
tracks (including the S&P 500, mid cap and smaller cap stocks) in 2003, up from 15.7% 
in the previous year; the median value for the overhang was 16.3%, up from 14.8% in the 
prior year. Figure 1 graphs the overhang, as computed by IRRC, from 1997 to 2004: 
 
While smaller companies have higher numbers of options outstanding than larger market 
cap companies, even the larger market cap companies in the S&P 500 reported an option 
overhang of 16.4%. The pervasiveness of options can also be seen in the number of 
companies that grant options to management and in the number where options 
outstanding represent a very high percent of the outstanding stock. In 2003, for instance, 
IRRC reported that almost 90% of the firms in their sample had some options overhang 
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and that 67 companies (about 4.6% of the sample) had more than a 40% overhang, up 
from 3.6% in 2002 and 3% in 2001. 
 Another measure of the reach of options is the number of employees who receive 
options as part of pay packages. The National Center for Employee Ownership estimated 
that almost 3 million employees received options as part of compensation in 2000, up 
from less than a million in 1990 and that about 10 million employees held stock options 
in that year. This is backed up by the national compensation survey of the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics in March 2003, which reported that about 8% of all employees received 
options as compensation. The number was much higher for white-collar employees 
(about 12%) than for blue-collar (6%) and service employees (2%). Notwithstanding 
recent attempts to widen option grants, they remained heavily loaded towards top 
management at firms.  In 2002, for instance, the value of options granted to the CEO and 
the top 5 managers at S&P 500 firms accounted for about 9.5% of the total option 
grants.3 
 The decision by the Financial Accounting standards board to require all 
companies to begin expensing options, starting in 2006, has begun to have an effect on 
option grants. In 2004, IRRC reports a drop in the option overhang at all US companies 
and notes that companies are reexamining their option grant procedures in light of 
stockholder disapproval.  
Who uses options? 
 The IRRC study, quoted in the last section, categorized firms into 10 economic 
sectors and examined the magnitude of the options overhang in each sector. Technology 
companies had the biggest average overhang of 24.4% in 2003, up from 20.8% in the 
previous year. Utility and energy companies had the smallest overhang, averaging less 
than 8% in 2003.  These differences widened during the technology boom in the late 
1990s, with the advent of internet and new technology firms. Hall and Murphy, in their 
study of the problems associated with the use of employee stock options, report on option 
                                                
3 Hall, B.J.. and K.J. Murphy, 2003, The Trouble with Stock Options, Working Paper, NBER. They note 
that the CEO and top management share of options has dropped from about 15% in the early 1990s to less 
than 10% in 2002. 
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grants at old economy and new economy firms from 1993 to 2002. Figure 2 summarizes 
their findings: 
 
The differences across sectors may not be surprising but it is worth examining why they 
exist in the first place. In general, we can outline three factors that may explain these 
differences: 
a. Age and Growth Potential of firm: We would expect younger firms to use equity 
options substantially more than older and more mature companies. After all, if not 
having the cash to compensate employees is a factor behind the use of equity options, 
younger firms are far more likely to be cash constrained than more mature firms. 
b. Riskiness of firm: Riskier firms should be more likely to use equity options than safer 
firms. While most securities become less valuable as risk increases, options become 
more valuable. This is especially true if the market is over assessing the risk in a 
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company, since this firm’s options will be over valued by the employees receiving the 
options.4 
c. Market Valuation of firm: As we will see in the next section, there is a tax advantage 
that accrues to firms that use equity options as compensation. Firms that trade at high 
multiples of earnings will get a much bigger tax advantage from using options as 
compensation. 
None of these characteristics are static and they will change as firms move through the 
life cycle. We would expect to see option grants, as a percent of outstanding stock, to be 
greatest at young, risky firms, with high market valuations, and to decline as growth 
levels off, cash flows increase and valuations come down to earth.  Cisco provides an 
interesting case study of this transition, with figure 3 reporting on options granted as a 
percent of the outstanding stock every year from 1995 to 2004.  
 
Cisco’s option grants as a percent of outstanding stock has decline from above 5% in 
1995 and 1996 to about 3% in the 2002-2005 period. The value of option grants peaked 
                                                
4 Bergman, N. and D. Jenter, 2003, Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation, Working Paper, 
MIT. They make the argument that overoptimistic employees over value option grants and that firms take 
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in 2000, at the peak of the stock market bubble, and has declined fairly dramatically 
since.  
 While much of this discussion has centered on the granting of options by publicly 
traded firms, it is worth noting that the use of equity options is widespread in private 
businesses as well. The National Center for Employee Ownership surveyed 275 venture-
capital backed private businesses in the technology and telecommunications businesses. 
Of these firms, 77% provided options to all employees while 23% provided them to only 
select employees. If we couple this behavior with the fact that venture capital investors 
themselves receive options on equity (often in the form of convertible bonds and 
preferred stock), many young firms already have a substantial option overhang at the time 
of their initial public offerings. 
Characteristics of Option Grants 
Firms that use options as employee compensation typically issue them each year, 
with the strike price set equal to the prevailing stock price; employee options are usually 
at-the-money when issued. While maturities vary across firms, these options are typically 
long term, with a ten-year maturity representing the norm at issue. Naturally, at any point 
in time, the options outstanding at a firm will represent varying maturities since they 
were granted at different points in time.  Firms that use employee options usually restrict 
when and whether these options can be exercised. It is standard, for instance, that the 
options granted to an employee cannot be exercised until they are vested. For this to 
occur, the employee usually has to remain with the firm for a period that is specified with 
the contract. While firms add this restriction to keep employee turnover low, it also has 
implications for option valuation that will be examined later.  Figure 4 reports on vested 
and non-vested options at Cisco in 2005, broken down by exercise price. 
                                                                                                                                            
advantage of this over optimism. 
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The peak in the non-vested options around $19 reflects the fact that Cisco has traded 
around that price from 2003 to 2005 and most of the options issued during that period are 
still non-vested. The options that are deep out-of-the-money are almost all vested because 
they were issued in the halcyon days of high stock prices prior to 2000. 
There are other features that are shared by employee options. Employees can 
generally not trade options and they are thus illiquid. When employees leave a firm, they 
usually will be forced to exercise their options, assuming that they are vested. In the case 
of a merger or an acquisition, there will be forced exercise of all of the options 
outstanding at the target firm. 
Accounting For Options 
 As Warren Buffett said in 1998: "If options aren't a form of compensation, what 
are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is it? And if expenses shouldn't go into 
the calculation of earnings, where in the world should they go?" The debate about option 
expensing has been tendentious, with those opposed to the practice using every argument 
in the book, but the rational argument (in favor if expensing) seems to have finally 
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prevailed. In this section, we consider how accounting has treated employee options 
hitherto and how it proposes to treat them in the future.  
Conventional Treatment 
Many of the abuses associated with the use of options can be traced to accounting 
rules that have consistently miscategorized and misvalued options. In particular, there 
have been two key (and incorrect) assumptions that have guided the accounting for 
options: 
1. Exercise value is intrinsic value: The accounting rule that has governed the 
accounting of options grants at most firms through 2004 is the Accounting 
Principles Board opinion number 25 (APB 25), which defines the intrinsic value 
of an option as its exercise value and requires firms to show only this value at the 
time of the grant. Since most firms issue employee options at-the-money, this 
essentially gives a free pass to these firms; there is no exercise value for these 
options, and the accounting view of these options is that they are worth nothing at 
the time of the grant. 
2. Focus on exercise date rather than grant date: Closely following on the first 
assumption is the belief that options outstanding do not affect stockholders until 
they are exercised. Consequently, the expenses associated with options are 
considered only when they are exercised.  
The tax effect of options has mirrored the accounting treatment. Firms that issue options 
do not face any tax consequences in the year in which they make the issue. When the 
options are exercised, however, they are allowed to treat the difference between the stock 
price and the exercise price as a tax-deductible expense.  
 As a consequence of this accounting and tax treatment, young and risky 
companies were able to grant millions of long term options of considerable value to their 
employees, while recording no expenses for the grants. At the same time, they were able 
to defer their tax deduction for this expense to future years, when they presumably would 
receive larger tax benefits. 
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The Debate about Expensing Options 
 As we noted at the beginning of this section, the debate about whether to expense 
options has been going on for more than a decade. Since we don’t see any issues worth 
debating on the fundamental question of whether employee options are an operating 
expenses, it is worth looking at some of the arguments that have been posed by those who 
have opposed its expensing: 
1. Option grants do not affect current earnings and it is pure speculation as to whether 
they will affect future earnings: This argument is predicated on the uncertainty 
associated with whether options will have exercise value in the future. The counter is 
that the firms granting these options and the employees receiving them believe that 
they have value at the time of the grant. When firms give away or receive something 
of value, even if that value is an estimate, we have to record the transaction.  
2. Option pricing models do not provide precise estimates of option value: It is true that 
we need option pricing models to value options at the time of the grant, and that these 
models make assumptions that may not always hold for employee options. Thus, the 
values we get from these models are estimates and not precise values. As we will see 
in the next section, though, there are adaptations of these models that do a reasonably 
good job of fixing the faulty assumptions. Furthermore, we can confidently state that 
even the most imprecise option pricing model is likely to yield a value closer to the 
true value than the model used under conventional accounting which values options at 
exercise value.  
3. Expensing options will create more variability in earnings over time: Options that are 
recorded at one value at the time of their granting will change in value over time. 
Some may become worthless and some will become more valuable over time. This 
will create more earnings variability over time, but there are two counter arguments 
we would present to this one. The first is that the higher variability in earnings 
reflects reality: firms that choose to use options to reward employees are adding 
volatility to stockholder earnings. The second is that using options to compensate 
employees is a choice. Firms can choose to use stock or restricted stock for 
compensation and have less earnings variability over time. 
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4. Young firms will not be able to hire employees if they have to expense options: If 
those who argue against employee options are believed, expensing options will be the 
death knell for young technology firms. These firms, it is argued, will no longer be 
able to issue the options that they used to because of the losses that they would now 
have to report. We do not believe that there is a basis for this argument. First, 
investors have shown that they are willing to buy young technology firms with 
growth potential, even if they make losses. Second, any young firm whose business 
model and operating margins are dependent upon the accounting treatment of options 
for its long-term profitability and value is fundamentally a troubled firm. Perhaps, 
such firms will go under with option expensing and they should.  
5. Options are a non-cash expense: There are some accounting and valuation analysts 
who argue that option grants do not affect cash flows and that it therefore does not 
affect value. This argument makes no sense. After all, if the option-granting firm had 
issued the options to the market (as traded warrants) and used the resulting cash 
proceeds to compensate employees, we would have considered it an operating 
expense. We cannot reward firms for using their equity as currency. If we do, firms 
may very well switch to paying for everything with equity (stock or options) and 
claim to have no cash expenses at all.   
6. The information about employee options is already available in financial statements 
and expensing is just a formality: This is the argument that has the most resonance. 
Since the late 1990s, firms have provided information on both option grants in the 
current year and outstanding options. Analysts who want to adjust earnings and cash 
flows have therefore been able to do so and expensing the options will have little 
effect on their valuations. Unfortunately, there are many analysts and investors who 
still rely on the proverbial bottom line, which is accounting earnings. They will 
presumably get a better sense of the real earnings potential if employee options are 
expensed. 
The protestations and the lobbying power of those who have argued against expensing 
have delayed the implementation of the new rules for option expensing. Most of the 
market, though, has moved on. As of February 2004, 276 firms out of the S&P 500 
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(representing 41% of overall market capitalization) had shifted to accounting for the fair 
value of employee options at the time of the options were granted. 
New Rules on Employee Options 
 As we noted in an earlier section, most firms historically have used APB 25, 
which defined the exercise value of employee options as intrinsic value, to account for 
options. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recognized as early as 1994 
that this was incorrect and proposed a new standard (FAS 123) where options would be 
valued at the time of the grant and expensed. However, it allowed firms to continue to 
report earnings under the old rule and required only pro-forma earnings be computed 
based upon the new standard. 
 In 2002, FASB 148 was issued as a stopgap rule, laying out the two new 
transition methods for firms that wanted to voluntarily shift to value-based accounting for 
options. In 2003, the final version of the rule (FASB 123R) laid out the rules for 
accounting for options: 
• When options are granted, they have to be valued using an option pricing model. 
Firms can pick between binomial lattice models, Black Scholes and Monte Carlo 
simulations to value these options.5 The models can be adjusted to reflect the specific 
characteristics of employee options and a company can use different option pricing 
models to value different option grants. In addition, the option value has to be 
adjusted for expected forfeitures of these options.6 
• The value of the options can be spread over the vesting period, starting with the year 
of the grant. Thus, an option grant with an estimated value of $ 10 million and a 5-
year vesting period can be spread over the 5 years at $ 2 million a year.7 As a 
consequence, the employee option expense line item for most firms will reflect not 
                                                
5 The rule does require that the option value be a function of six inputs – the current stock price, the strike 
price, the expected life of the option (reflecting option maturity and vesting likelihood), the variance in the 
stock price, the riskless rate and expected dividends.  
6 This forfeiture rate can reflect historical patterns of exercise and forfeiture. Assuming a higher forfeiture 
rate will reduce the value of the options. 
7 The original version of this rule required accelerated write offs of employee option expenses, but the final 
version allowed firms to choose between the simpler straight line and accelerated write offs. 
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only the portion of the grant from that year, but also portions of option grants from 
previous years. 
• If the actual forfeiture rate is greater or less than the original estimate (used to value 
the options at grant), the option value has to be re-estimated in subsequent years and 
compensation cost adjusted in that year to reflect the changes.8  
• If option terms are modified, as is the case when the exercise price is reset, the firm 
has to recognize the change in option value at the time of the modification. 
Undoubtedly, the rule will be revisited once firms begin expensing options and run into 
real world problems.  
International Differences 
 As the use of employee options as compensation expands outside the United 
States, international accounting standards have also had to grapple with how best to deal 
with them. The International Financial Reporting Standards Board released IFRS 2 in 
February 2004, requiring companies that use equity options as compensation to value 
them at the time of the grant.  In fact, IFRS 2 is more expansive than FAS 123R in its 
coverage of equity-based compensation. For the most part, though, the two statements 
agree or more than they disagree and the differences that remain are minor. Some of them 
are listed below: 
• Private versus Public entities: IFRS 2 applies the same rules about option valuation to 
both public and non-public entities; both have to value options at fair value at the 
time of the grant and treat it as an expense. While FAS 123R requires nonpublic 
entities to account for options based on their fair value, it does allow the use of 
industry average variances in valuing private company options and for the use of 
intrinsic value (exercise value) when option valuation is difficult to do. 
• Deferred Tax Treatment: In tax jurisdictions such as the United States, where only the 
exercise value of the option is tax deductible (rather than the entire value of options), 
IFRS 2 requires that a deferred tax asset be recognized only if and when the share 
                                                
8 To provide an illustration, assume that a firm assumes a forfeiture rate of 3% and estimates the value of 
the options when they are granted at $ 10 million; the annual cost each year over a 5-year vesting period 
will be $ 2 million a year. If a year later, the forfeiture rate is running at 2%, the firm will have to revalue 
the options using the actual forfeiture rate and adjust the compensation that year to reflect the change. 
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options have exercise value that can be deductible for tax purposes. Therefore, 
options that are issued at the money will not create deferred tax assets until that award 
is in the money. In contrast, FAS 123R requires recognition of a deferred tax asset 
based on the grant-date fair value of the award. The effects of subsequent decreases in 
the share price (or lack of an increase) are not reflected in accounting for the deferred 
tax asset until the related compensation cost is recognized for tax purposes. The 
effects of subsequent stock price increases that generate excess tax benefits are 
recognized when they affect taxes payable. 
Over time, we can expect to see the remaining differences narrow and a convergence 
between U.S. and International standards. 
Options Effect on Value 
 Why does the granting of options affect value per share? Note that not all options 
do. In fact, options issued and listed by the options exchanges have no effect on the value 
per share of the firms on which they are issued. The options issued by firms do have an 
effect on value per share, since there is a chance that they will be exercised in the near or 
far future. Given that these options offer the right to individuals to buy stock at a fixed 
price, they will be exercised only if the stock price rises above that exercise price. When 
firms grant options to employees, it is existing stockholders who pay for these options. 
Consequently, the question is not whether options affect value but how they affect value.   
In this section, we will consider three levels at which options affect equity value 
per share. The first and narrowest measure is the effect that granting options in the 
current year will have on the current earnings of a firm. The second is the potential 
dilution effect created not just by options issued in the current year but by the cumulative 
options outstanding at the firm; the exercise of options will increase the number of shares 
at some future date, but expectations of that happening will affect the value per share 
today. The third is and broadest measure looks at the effect that the continued granting of 
options will have on expected future earnings and thus on value per share. 
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Earnings Effect 
 In the last section, we presented the argument, that accounting standards have 
now accepted for the most part, that employee options are compensation and should be 
treated as part of operating expenses. If we accept this argument, firms that grant options 
as part of compensation will report lower earnings.  
 The earnings effect of option grants varies across firms. In a study of the S&P 500 
and the NASDAQ 100 firms, Bear Stearns estimated the effect of employee options being 
treated as expenses on the earnings of individual firms.9 On average, they estimated that 
earnings would decline 8% at S&P 500 companies if option grants were treated as 
expenses and by 25% at NASDAQ 100 companies.10 They also estimated the earnings 
effect of option expensing on each of the 600 companies. Figure 5 summarizes the effect 
on net income of considering share-based employee compensation as an expense on firms 
in different sectors of the S&P 500: 
                                                
9 2004 Earnings Impact of Stock Options on the S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100 Earnings, Bear Stearns Equity 
Research publication, March 21, 2005.  
10 The Bear Stearns study looks at the effect of forcing option expensing on all companies and comes up 
with a 5% drop in net income at S&P 500 companies and 22% at technology companies. However, it also 
notes that some companies had already switched to expensing options in 2003. The numbers we report 
include the option expenses at those companies as well and are thus larger. 
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The effect was greatest at technology companies, where the cumulative cost of share-
based compensation would have amounted to $15.43 billion in 2004, representing 32% of 
the unadjusted net income (prior to expensing share-based compensation) of $ 48.53 
billion. 
Dilution Effect 
 While option grants in the current year reduce earnings for the year, the value of 
equity per share in a company is weighed down by the cumulative effect of options that 
have been granted over time that are still outstanding. While some of these options may 
be out-of-the-money, there is still a probability that they will be exercised in the future, 
thus increasing the number of shares outstanding. This potential dilution effect from 
options outstanding will reduce the value of equity per share, and will do so more at firms 
that have more options outstanding (as a percent of outstanding shares) than at firms with 
less. Figure 2, reported earlier, noted the differences in the option overhang at firms in 
old economy, new economy, financial service and utility companies. 
 Analysts and accountants have tried to grapple with the potential value loss from 
dilution by using fully diluted (where all options are treated as outstanding shares) or 
 20 
partially diluted (where only in—the-money options are considered) numbers of shares 
when computing the earnings per share. These measures do not reflect or even attempt to 
measure the probabilities that options will be exercised and thus provide only a very 
rough proxy for the dilution effect. 
 There are some who argue that there does not have to be a dilution effect from 
option exercise. Many firms, they note, repurchase stock and set them aside to cover 
option exercise rather than issuing new shares. That is true but such actions still affect 
value per share by affecting expected cash flows. In the absence of these options, the 
stockholders of these firms would have been able to lay claim to much larger cash flows 
each year (even though they might not have received them as dividends).  
Future Earnings Effect 
 Looking at options granted in the current year (and the effect on earnings) and 
cumulative options (and the dilution effect) allows analysts to consider the effect of past 
option grants on value. However, most firms that grant options will continue to use them 
in the future, thus affecting future earnings. The expected option grants are employee 
compensation and will increase operating expenses in future years and reduce operating 
income. The value of a firm today is the present value of expected cash flows, and these 
will be much lower for a firm that is expected to be more generous with its option grants.  
 Accounting standards have finally come to grips with the effect of granting 
options on current earnings (see FAS 123R) and analysts do attempt to capture the 
dilution effect, albeit sloppily, with diluted share numbers. Analysts, though, are still 
haphazard about dealing with expected future option grants. While some try to forecast 
the magnitude of these grants, most valuations either completely ignore them or build 
them in implicitly by forecasting out a current income number that incorporates option 
expenses.11 
                                                
11 For example, assume that we are valuing Coca Cola, a company which has been expensing employee 
options since 2003. If we use earnings in 2004 as our base year and apply an expected growth rate to it, we 
are assuming that option expenses will continue as a line item into the future but that it will remain at the 
same percentage of revenues it was in 2004. 
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Ways of incorporating existing options into discounted cash flow valuations 
 As we noted in the last section, the value per share is weighed down by the 
cumulative effect of all options outstanding. There are four approaches that are used to 
incorporate that effect of options that are already outstanding into the value per share. 
The first is to adjust the number of shares outstanding to reflect options outstanding. The 
second is to try to forecast out when the options will be exercised and the effect on share 
numbers in future years. The third, called the treasury stock approach, is an extension of 
the first approach. In addition to using diluted shares, this approach also adjusts the value 
of the equity to reflect the expected proceeds from the option exercise. The last approach 
values the options outstanding at fair value rather than at exercise value, and subtracts 
this from the overall value of equity to arrive at the value of equity in common stock. We 
believe that the last approach is the only one that completely incorporates the effect of 
existing options into value per share. 
I. Use fully diluted number of shares to estimate per-share value 
The simplest way to incorporate the effect of outstanding options on value per share 
is to divide the estimated value of equity from a discounted cash flow model by the 
number of shares that will be outstanding if all options are exercised today – the fully 
diluted number of shares. While this approach has the virtue of simplicity, it will lead to 
too low of an estimate of value per share for three reasons: 
• It considers all options outstanding, not just ones that are in the money and vested. To 
be fair, there are variants of this approach where the shares outstanding are adjusted 
to reflect only in-the-money and vested options.  
• It does not incorporate the expected proceeds from exercise, which will comprise a 
cash inflow to the firm. 
• Finally, this approach does not build in the time premium on the options into the 
valuation.  
Illustration 1: Fully Diluted Approach to estimating Value per Share 
 To apply the fully diluted approach to estimate the per share value, we will value 
two companies with significant option overhangs – Cisco and Google. In Table 1 we 
summarize the equity values we estimated for the companies, using conventional 
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discounted cash flow models, and then adjust for value per share using fully diluted 
shares.12 
Table 1: Fully Diluted Approach to Estimating Value per Share 
 Cisco Google 
Value of Equity (in millions) $    65,622 $  32,187 
Primary Shares (in millions) 6,487 277.78 
Options outstanding 1436 25.61 
Fully Diluted Shares 7,923 303.39 
Value per share (Primary) $ 10.12 $       115.87 
Value per share (fully diluted) $   8.28 $       106.09 
The value per share, using the fully diluted approach, is significantly lower than the value 
per share, using the primary shares outstanding. This value, however, ignores both the 
proceeds from the exercise of the options as well as the time value inherent in the 
options. At Cisco, for example, a significant number of the options issued in past years 
are out-of-the-money and may never be exercised. 
 A modified version of this approach counts only in-the-money options when 
computing diluted shares. With this approach, we estimate the following values per share 
for Cisco and Google: 
 Cisco Google 
Value of Equity (in millions) $    65,622 $  32,187 
Primary Shares (in millions) 6,487 277.78 
In-the-money options 591 25.61 
Partially Diluted Shares 7,076 303.39 
Value per share (partially diluted) $   9.27 $ 106.09 
For Google, there is no effect from the adjustment since all their options are in-the-
money. For Cisco, only 591 million shares are in-the-money (based upon the stock price 
of $17.67 at the time of the analysis). In fact, counting only vested in-the-money options 
at Cisco would reduce the number of options considered to 441 million options and 
increase the value per share a little more. 
                                                
12 These were conventional discounted cash flow valuations. Details of the valuations can be obtained on 
my web site (http://www.damodaran.com). 
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II. Estimate expected option exercises in the future and build in expected dilution 
In this approach, we forecast when in the future options will be exercised and build in 
the expected cash outflows associated with the exercise, by assuming that the firm will go 
out and buy back stock to cover the exercise. The biggest limitation of this approach is 
that it requires estimates of what the stock price will be in the future and when options 
will be exercised on the stock. Given that our objective is to examine whether the price 
today is correct, forecasting future prices to estimate the current value per share seems 
circular. In general, this approach is neither practical nor is it particularly useful in 
coming up with reasonable estimates of value.  
III. Treasury Stock Approach 
This approach is a variant of the fully diluted approach. Here, the number of shares is 
adjusted to reflect options that are outstanding, but the expected proceeds from the 
exercise (the product of the exercise price and the number of options) are added to the 
value of equity. The limitations of this approach are that, like the fully diluted approach, 
it does not consider the time premium on the options and there is no effective way of 
dealing with vesting. Generally, this approach, by under estimating the value of options 
granted, will over estimate the value of equity per share. 
The biggest advantage of this approach is that it does not require a value per share (or 
stock price) to incorporate the option value into per-share value. As we will see with the 
last (and recommended) approach, there is a circularity that is created when the stock 
price is an input into the process of estimating option value which, in turn, is needed to 
obtain the value per share. 
Illustration 2: Treasury Stock Approach 
In Table 2, we re-estimated the value per share is estimated using the treasury stock 
approach for Cisco and Google: 
Table 2: Value of Equity per Share: Treasury Stock Approach 
 Cisco Google 
Number of options outstanding 1436 25.61 
Average exercise price $ 25.02 $24.41 
Proceeds from Exercise $ 35,928 $ 625 
   
Value of Equity $ 65,622 $ 32,187 
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 + Proceeds from Exercise $ 35,928 $ 625 
Total Value $101,550 $32,812 
Fully Diluted number of shares 7923 303.39 
Value per share  $12.82 $108.15 
Note that the value per share using this approach is higher than the value per share 
using the fully diluted approach for both companies. The difference is greatest for Cisco 
because the average exercise price is high, relative to the current stock price. For Google, 
the effect is much smaller since the \exercise price is well below the current stock price 
(of almost $300). The estimated value per share still ignores the time value of the options. 
 As with the diluted approach, there are modified versions of this approach where 
only in-the-money options are considered. This will reduce the value per share for Cisco 
considerably since the average exercise price for the in-the-money options is much lower 
than the weighted average exercise price of $25.02. 
IV. Valuing Options 
 The correct approach to dealing with options is to estimate the value of the 
options today, given today’s value per share and the time premium on the option. Once 
this value has been estimated, it is subtracted from the estimated equity value, and 
divided by the number of shares outstanding to arrive at value per share. 
Value of Equity per share = (Estimated Value of Equity – Value of Employee Options 
outstanding)/ Primary number of shares outstanding 
In this section, we will consider both the measurement issues associated with valuing 
employee options and the models that have been developed to value them. 
Measurement Issues 
In valuing employee options, however, there are five measurement issues that we 
have to confront. One relates to the fact that not all of the options outstanding are vested, 
and that some of the non-vested options might never become vested. The second centers 
on the illiquidity of employee options. As a result, employee options are often exercised 
before maturity, making them less valuable than otherwise similar traded options that are 
marketable. The third relates to the stock price to use in valuing these options. While 
conventional option pricing models are built around using the current market price as a 
key input, we do come up with estimates of value per share when we value companies, 
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and these estimates can be very different from current stock prices. We have to consider 
whether we want to use our estimates of value per share, rather than the market prices, to 
preserve valuation consistency. The fourth issue is taxation. As we noted earlier in the 
section on accounting for options, firms are allowed to deduct the difference between the 
stock and the exercise price of an option at exercise and there is potential tax saving at 
the time of option exercise. The final issue relates to options granted at private firms or 
firms on the verge of a public offering. Key inputs to the option-pricing model, including 
the stock price and the variance, cannot be obtained for these firms, but the options have 
to be valued nevertheless. 
a. Vesting 
 As noted earlier in the paper, firms granting employee options usually require that 
the employee receiving the options stay with the firm for a specified period, for the 
option to be vested. Consequently, when we examine the options outstanding at a firm, 
we are looking at a mix of vested and non-vested options. The non-vested options should 
be worth less than the vested options, but the probability of vesting will depend upon how 
in-the-money the options are and the period left for an employee to vest. There have been 
attempts13 to develop option pricing models that allow for the possibility that employees 
may leave a firm before vesting and forfeit the value of their options.  Carpenter (1998) 
developed a simple extension of the standard option pricing model to allow for early 
exercise and forfeiture, and used it to value executive options.14 Since the new accounting 
standards governing employee options require firms to estimate forfeiture rates at the 
time of the grant, there will undoubtedly be attempts to build new models for vesting and 
forfeiture. 
b. Illiquidity 
 Employees who are compensated with options can become wealthy on paper but 
may not be able to cash in on their implicit wealth because the options cannot be traded. 
In addition, it is often infeasible or illegal to hedge these options. The effect of this 
                                                
13 Cuny, C. and P. Jorion, 1995, Valuing Executive Stock Options with Endogenous Departure, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, v20, 193-205.. They examine the valuation of options when there is the 
possibility of forfeiture. 
14 Carpenter, J.N. (1998), ‘The exercise and valuation of executive stock options’, Journal of Financial 
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illiquidity on option value has been both widely studied and well debated. In particular, 
the illiquidity of these options may induce employees to exercise options early and give 
up the time premiums on these options. 
While some have argued that early exercise is irrational, there are clearly good 
reasons for early exercise. Huddart (1994) shows that early exercise is in fact optimal for 
a risk-averse investor.15 Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) and Hemmer, 
Matsunaga, and Shevlin (1994), show that restrictions on short selling and hedging option 
positions can lead to early exercise.16 Brooks, Chance and Cline (2005) argue that private 
information may also cause early exercise: the managers who hold employee options 
often have the information to make a judgment on whether their stock is over valued or 
not. If it is over valued, in their estimation, early exercise becomes more likely.17 
 The empirical evidence is also clearly supportive of the early exercise theory. In a 
comprehensive study of 262,931 option exercises of employee options between 1996 and 
2003 by U.S. companies, Brooks, Chance and Cline (cited above) note that 92.3% 
exercise early. On average, they find that exercise takes place 2.69 years after vesting, 
with 4.71 years left to expiration. Put another way, an employee option with a stated 
maturity of 10 years is usually exercised in 5.29 years. Bettis, Bizjak and Lemmon (2003) 
also find significant variation in exercise policies across firms, with employees in riskier 
firms exercising their options almost one and a half years earlier than employees in more 
stable firms.18 The implications for option valuation are straightforward. Using the stated 
maturity in option pricing models, which is what we do for most marketable options, will 
overstate the value of employee options.  
                                                                                                                                            
Economics, v 48, 127–158. 
15 Huddart, S. 1994.  Employee Stock Options. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 18, 207-231. 
16 Lambert, R., D. Lacker, and R. Verrecchia. 1991.  Portfolio Considerations in Valuing Executive 
Compensation.  Journal of Accounting Research, Spring, 129-149; Hemmer, T., S. Matsunaga, and T. 
Shevlin. 1994. Estimating the ‘Fair Value’ of Employee Stock Options with Expected Early Exercise. 
Accounting Horizons, vol. 8, no. 4 (December): 23-42. 
17 Brooks, R., D. Chance and B.N. Cline, Private Information and the Exercise of Executive Stock Options, 
Working Paper, SSRN. 
18 Bettis, J.C., J.M. Bizjak and M.L. Lemmon, 2003, The Cost of Employee Stock Options, Working Paper, 
SSRN. 
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c. Which stock price? 
 The answer to this question may seem obvious. Since the stock is traded, and we 
can obtain a stock price, it would seem that we should be using the current stock price to 
value options. However, we are valuing these options to arrive at a value per share that 
we will then compare to the market price to decide whether a stock is under or over 
valued. For instance, we may conclude that a stock with a price of $ 25 per share is really 
worth only $12 per share. Using the current market price to arrive at the value of the 
options and then using this option value to estimate an entirely different value per share 
seems inconsistent. 
 There is a solution. You can value the options using the estimated value per share. 
This creates circular reasoning in our valuation. In other words, we need the option value 
to estimate value per share, and the value per share to estimate the option value.  We can 
estimate the value per share using the treasury stock approach, and we can then converge 
on the proper value per share by iterating.19 
 There is another related issue. When options are exercised, they increase the 
number of shares outstanding, and thus have an effect on the stock price. In conventional 
option pricing models, the exercise of the option does not affect the stock price. These 
models have to be adapted to allow for the dilutive effect of option exercise.   
d. Taxation 
 When options are exercised, the firm can deduct the difference between the stock 
price at the time and the exercise price as an employee expense, for tax purposes. This 
potential tax benefit reduces the drain on value created by having options outstanding. To 
provide an illustration of the magnitude of the tax benefit, Cisco claimed a tax deduction 
of $2.5 billion for option exercise in 2000, almost entirely offsetting its operating income 
of $2.67 billion that year and effectively paying little in taxes. There are three ways in 
which we can account for this tax deductibility in valuing employee: 
1. Reduce tax rates on operating income to reflect employee option deductions: To 
compute free cashflow to the firm, we use after-tax operating income.  If a firm has 
                                                
19 The value per share, obtained using the treasury stock approach, will become the stock price in the 
option pricing model. The option value that results from using this price is used to compute a new value per 
share which is fed back into the option pricing model and so on. 
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substantial numbers of options outstanding, we could use a much lower tax rate in the 
near years of the forecasts to reflect tax deductions from employee options.20 This will 
increase cash flows in those years (and consequently value). We would move the tax 
rates towards statutory tax rates as we approach terminal value, since the option exercise 
tax savings will fade over time. 
2. Tax Effect the exercise value of options; A simpler way to estimate the tax benefit is to 
multiply the difference between the stock price today and the exercise price by the tax 
rate; clearly, this would make sense only if the options are in-the-money. While this does 
not allow for the expected price appreciation over time, it has the benefit of simplicity.  
3. Tax Effect the fair value of options: An alternative way of estimating the tax benefit is 
to compute the after-tax value of the options: 
After-tax Value of Options = Value from option pricing model (1- tax rate) 
This approach is also straightforward and allows us to consider the tax benefits from 
option exercise in valuation. One of the advantages of this approach is that it can be used 
to consider the potential tax benefit even when options are out of the money.  
 Now that the accounting rules have changed to force option expensing, it seems to 
us only a matter of time before the tax rules change as well to match. If that does happen, 
we will be able to expense option grants in the periods that they are made and we will no 
longer need to tax effect the existing options (since the tax savings would have accrued 
when the options were granted).  
e. Non-traded Firms 
 A couple of key inputs to the option pricing model – the current price per share 
and the variance in stock prices – cannot be obtained if a firm is not publicly traded. 
There are two choices in this scenario. One is to revert to the treasury stock approach to 
estimate the value of the options outstanding and abandon the option pricing models. The 
other is to stay with the option pricing models and to use the value per share, from the 
                                                
20 Edwards, C., J. R. Graham, M.H. Lang and D. Shackelford, Employee Stock Options and Taxes, 
Working Paper, SSRN. In this paper, they estimate the tax rates for firms with substantial employee 
optrions outstanding and note that it is well below the marginal tax rate. For Dell, they estimate a tax rate of 
20%, as a result of option expensing, as opposed to the marginal tax rate of 35%. 
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discounted cash flow model. The variance of similar firms that are publicly traded can be 
used to estimate the value of the options. 
Option Pricing Models 
 With all of these issues affecting valuation, how do we adapt conventional option 
pricing models to value employee options? This question has been addressed both by 
academics who value options and by FASB, in its attempts to give guidance to firms that 
have to value these options for expensing.  
Black Scholes and Modifications 
 The conventional Black Scholes model is designed to value European options on 
traded assets and does not explicitly factor in the dilution inherent in employee options or 
the illiquidity/vesting issues specific to these options. However, adaptations of the model 
provide reasonable estimates of value: 
1. Build in expected dilution into the stock price: One of the inputs into the Black 
Scholes is the current stock price. To the extent that the exercise of options increases 
the number of shares outstanding (at a price less than the current stock price), the 
stock price will drop on exercise. A simple adjustment to the stock price can 
incorporate this effect: 
Adjusted Stock Price = Current Stock Price 
! 
nshares outstanding
(nshares outstanding + noptions)
" 
# 
$ 
$ 
% 
& 
' 
' 
The resulting lower adjusted stock price will also reduce the option value. 
2. Reduce the life of the option to reflect illiquidity and early exercise: Earlier in this 
paper, we noted that employees often exercise options well before maturity because these 
options are illiquid. Typically, options are exercised about half way through their stated 
lives. Using a reduced life for the option will reduce its value. 
3. Adjust option value for probability of vesting: The vesting adjustment can be made in 
the process of calculating of the option value. If we can assess the probability of vesting, 
multiplying this probability by the option value will yield an expected value for the 
option. 
While purist would still resist, the model has provided remarkably resilient even in 
environments where its basic assumptions are violated. 
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 There are numerous variants of the Black-Scholes model that have been 
developed for employee options. Two examples are listed below: 
1. The FASB Model: While FASB does not propose a specific model, they recommend 
that employee options be valued assuming a forfeiture rate for employees (based upon 
the firm’s history) and using a shorter life than the stated maturity (allowing for the 
early exercise option). To make both estimates, they recommend using historical data. 
2. The Bulow-Shoven Model: The Bulow-Shoven model starts off with the premise that 
long-term employee options are not long term at all. The model proposes a technique 
that begins by treating all employee stock options as if they have a 90 day life, in 
estimating an initial value using a Black-Scholes model. However, as employees 
continue working for the firm day to day, quarter to quarter, they are granted 90-day 
extensions on the term of their options and these extensions are valued as options and 
treated as expenses in subsequent periods.21 
These variations yield lower values for employee options than using the unadjusted Black 
Scholes models. 
Binomial Models 
 The possibility of early exercise and non-vesting, which is substantial in 
employee options, leads many practitioners to argue for the use of Binomial lattice 
models to value employee options. Unlike the Black-Scholes, these models not only can 
model for early exercise, but can be modified to allow for other special features specific 
to employee options, including vesting. In addition, binomial models allow for more 
flexibility on inputs, with volatility changing from period to period rather than remaining 
constant (which is the assumption in the Black-Scholes model). The limitation of the 
binomial models is that they are more information intensive, requiring the user to input 
prices at each branch of the binomial model. In any realistic version of the model, where 
the time intervals are short, this could translate into hundreds of potential prices. 
It is true that we can derive binomial trees from standard deviations and thus 
avoid the estimation problems associated with developing these trees, but the resulting  
values tend to be close to Black-Scholes model values. In other words, to get the full 
                                                
21 Bulow, J. and J..B. Shoven, 2004, Accounting for Stock Options, Working Paper, SSRN. 
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benefits of the binomial model, we have to go through the exercise of developing the 
pricing tree.   The initial version of FAS 123R did require firms to use binomial models 
to value employee options. The final version wisely left the model choice decision to the 
firm. 
The primary benefit of binomial models comes from the flexibility that they offer 
users to model the interaction between the stock price and early exercise. One example is 
the Hull-White Model, which proposes reducing the life used to value employee options 
to a more realistic level.22 This model take into account the employee exit rate during the 
vesting period (thus taking into account the probability that options will end up unvested 
and worthless) and the expected life of the option after they get vested. To estimate the 
latter, the model assumes that there will be exercise if the stock price reaches a pre-
specified multiple of the exercise price, thus making exercise an endogenous component 
of the model, rather than an exogenous component. The resulting option values are 
usually lower than those estimated using the Black-Scholes model. 
Simulation Models 
 The third choice for valuing employee options is Monte Carlo simulation models. 
These models begin with a distribution for stock prices and a pre-specified exercise 
strategy. The stock prices are then simulated to arrive at the probabilities that employee 
options will be exercised and an expected value for the options based upon the exercise. 
The advantage of simulations is that they offer the most flexibility for building in the 
conditions that may affect the value of employee options. In particular, the interplay 
between vesting, the stock price and early exercise can all be built into the simulation 
rather than specified as assumptions. The disadvantage is that simulations require far 
more information than other models. 
Market Prices 
 All of the models proposed to value employee options can be contested as 
hypothetical and unrealistic. In fact, there is a reasonable argument that what we would 
really want to use to value employee options are market prices for these options. While 
                                                
22 J. Hull and A. White, How to Value Employee Stock Options, Financial Analysts Journal 60 (1) (2004), 
114{119. 
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this may seem unrealistic, Cisco proposed a novel solution to the employee option 
valuation problem, by creating a "market instrument" that would parallel employee 
options. Buyers of the new instruments, called employee stock option reference 
securities, or ESORs, would not be able to transfer them and would have options that 
would vest over five years. Both provisions are similar to those in employee stock 
options. Cisco argued that the market prices for these securities should be used to 
value employee options. In September 2005, the SEC rejected the Cisco proposal, 
arguing that investors in companies would not value employee options at the same 
level as employees would. They did leave the door open to a market based solution at 
a future date.  
How much does the model matter? 
 How much does the model used to value employee options matter? Put another 
way, are there significant differences in values when we use alternative models to value 
employee options? For the most part, the biggest single component determining 
employee option value is the life of the option. Using the stated life of employee options 
in the Black-Scholes models yields too high a value for these options. If we use an 
expected life for the option (which takes into account early exercise and vesting 
probabilities), the values that we arrive at are not dissimilar using different models. 
Ammann and Seiz (2003) show that the employee option pricing models in use (the 
binomial, Black Scholes with adjusted life and Hull White) all yield similar values.23 As a 
consequence, they argue we should steer away from models that require difficult to estimate 
inputs (such as risk aversion coefficients) and towards simpler models. 
 
Illustration 3: Option Value Approach 
 In Table 3, we begin by estimating the value of the options outstanding at Cisco 
and Google, using the Black-Scholes model, adjusted for dilution and using half the 
stated maturity (to allow for early exercise). To estimate the value of the options, we first 
                                                
23 Ammann, M., and R. Seiz, 2003, Does the Model Matter? A Valuation Analysis of Employee Stock 
Options, Working Ppaer, SSRN. 
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estimate the standard deviation in stock prices24 over the previous 2 years. Weekly stock 
prices are used to make this estimate, and this estimate is annualized25. All options, 
vested as well as non-vested, are valued and there is no adjustment for non-vesting.  
Table 3: Estimated Value of Options Outstanding 
Option Pricing Model Cisco Google 
Number of Options Outstanding 1436 25.61 
Average Exercise Price $ 25.02 $24.41 
Estimated Standard Deviation (Volatility) 45% 55% 
Average stated maturity 5.17 9.00 
Maturity adjusted for early exercise 2.58 4.50 
Stock Price at time of analysis $17.67 $295.97 
Value per option $ 2.27 $ 274.27 
Value of options outstanding $ 3,257 $ 7.023 
Tax Rate 36.80% 35.00% 
After-tax Value of options outstanding $ 2,058 $ 4,565 
In estimating the after-tax value of the options at these companies, we have used the 
marginal tax rate of 35%. Since the tax law allows for tax deductions only at exercise and 
only for the exercise value, we are potentially overstating the possible tax benefits (and 
understating the costs). 
 The value per share is computed in Table 4 by subtracting the value of the options 
outstanding from the value of equity and then dividing by the primary number of shares 
outstanding: 
Table 4: Value of Equity per Share 
 Cisco Google 
Value of Equity $65,622 $ 32,187 
 - Value of Options outstanding $ 2,058 $ 4,565 
Value of Equity in shares outstanding $ 63,564 $  27.622 
Primary shares outstanding 6487 277.78 
Value per Share $ 9.80 $99.44 
                                                
24 The variance estimate is actually on the natural log of the stock prices. This allows us  to cling to at least 
the possibility of a normal distribution. Neither stock prices nor stock returns can be normally distributed 
since prices cannot fall below zero and returns cannot be lower than –100%. 
25 All of the inputs to the Black Scholes model have to be in annual terms. To annualize a weekly variance, 
we multiply by 52. 
 34 
The inconsistency averred to earlier is clear when we compare the value per share that we 
have estimated in this table to the price per share that we used in the previous one to 
estimate the value of the options. For instance, Google’s value per share is $99.44, 
whereas the price per share used in the option valuation is $ 295.97. If we choose to 
iterate, we would revalue the options using the estimated value of $99.44, which would 
lower the value of the options and increase the value per share, leading to a second 
iteration and a third one and so on. The values converge to yield a consistent estimate. 
The consistent estimates of value are provided in Table 5: 
Table 5: Consistent Estimates of Value per Share 
 Cisco Google 
Value of Options (with current stock price) $ 2,058 $ 4,565 
Value per share $9.80 $99.44 
   
Value of Options (with iterated value) $ 332 $1,501 
Value per share $ 10.07 $        110.47 
For both firms, the estimated after-tax value of the options drops dramatically, leading to 
an increase in value per share.   
Ways of incorporating existing options into relative value 
 Just as options affect intrinsic valuations, they also affect relative valuations. In 
particular, comparing multiples across companies is complicated by the fact that firms 
often have varying numbers of employee options outstanding. A failure to explicitly 
factor these options into analysis will result in companies with unusually large or small 
(relative to the peer group) numbers of options outstanding looking misvalued on a 
relative basis. 
 To see the effect of options on earnings multiples, consider the most widely used 
one, which is the PE ratio. The numerator is usually the current price per share and the 
denominator is earnings per share. Analysts who use primary earnings per share are 
clearly biasing their analysis towards finding companies with higher option overhang to 
be undervalued.  To see why, note that the price per share should incorporate the effect of 
options outstanding – the market price will be lower when there are more employee 
options outstanding, but the denominator does not since it reflects actual shares 
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outstanding and does not capture potential dilution. Note that this bias will not disappear 
when firms switch to expensing options. 
   To counter this, analysts often use fully diluted earnings per share to incorporate 
the effect of outstanding options, thus penalizing companies with large numbers of 
options outstanding. The problem with this approach is that it treats all options 
equivalently, with the number of shares increasing by the same unit whether the option is 
out-of-the-money and has three weeks left to expiration or deep in-the-money and has 
five years left to maturity. Clearly, firms that have more of the latter should trade at lower 
market values (for any given level of earnings) and will look cheaper on a diluted basis. 
 What is the solution? The only way to incorporate the effect of options into 
earnings multiples is to value the options at fair value, using the current stock price as the 
basis, and add this  value on to the market capitalization to arrive at the total market value 
of equity.26 This total market value of equity can be divided by aggregate net income to 
arrive at a PE ratio that incorporates (correctly) the existence of options. This will allow 
analysts to consider all options outstanding and incorporate their characteristics into the 
value. 
Option corrected PE = 
! 
(Market Capitalization +  Estimated value of options oustanding)
Net Income
 
The net income used should be the earnings estimated on the assumption that employee 
options are compensation and operating expenses. With the adoption of 123R, this should 
become a little easier to do. 
 Everything that we have said about earnings multiples can also be said about book 
value multiples. Failing to incorporate the value of equity options into the market value 
of equity will make option-heavy companies look cheaper, relative to companies that 
have fewer options outstanding. The solution is the same as it was for earnings multiples. 
Estimating the value of employee options and adding them to market capitalization will 
almost always eliminate the bias in the comparison process. 
                                                
26 Harking back to the last section, the value of options used should be calculated based upon the current 
stock price (rather than an estimated value) and on a pre-tax basis. 
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Illustration 4: Adjusting PE ratio for options outstanding 
 Consider Cisco and Google, two companies for which we estimated the value of 
options outstanding in illustration 3. In table 6, we estimate the conventional PE ratio and 
contrast it with the adjusted PE ratio, using the approach described above: 
Table 6: PE ratio versus Adjusted PE ratio: Cisco and Google 
 Cisco Google 
Stock price $ 17.67 $ 295.97 
Primary EPS $ 0.885 $3.48 (Trailing 12 month) 
Diluted EPS $0.725 $3.19 
Primary PE 19.97 84.92 
Diluted PE 24.39 92.75 
Market Capitalization $114,625 million $82,214 million 
+ Value of options $   3,257 million $ 7.023 million 
Market Value of Equity $ 117,882 million $89,237 million 
Net Income $   5,741 million $ 968 million 
Net Income after option 
expensing 
$   4,712 mil $ 953 milliion 
Adjusted PE 117,882/4712 = 25.02 89,237/953 = 93.64 
In making the adjustments to net income for option expensing, we use the information 
provided by the firms in their financial statements to estimate pro-forma income. Cisco 
reported $1,628 million in employee option expenses for the current year, thus creating 
an after-tax expense of $1.029 million. This is subtracted from the stated net income. For 
Google, we had to improvise since the net income number used was based upon trailing 
12-month data  (through June 30, 2005) and the employee option adjustment is available 
only for the last financial year (ending December 31, 2004). Google reports an 
adjustment to net income of $ 15 million in after-tax terms for the 2004 fiscal year 
income. We had made the same adjustment to the trailing 12-month earnings, though the 
actual adjustment will probably be higher. 
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Future Option Grants and Effect on Value 
While existing options act as a drag on value, they are but part of the problem. 
Firms that have issued options in the past will probably continue to keep using them in 
the future. In this section, the argument for why these expected future option issues affect 
value and how to incorporate these effects into value is presented. 
Why future option issues affect value 
 Just as options outstanding represent potential dilution or cash outflows to 
existing equity investors, expected option grants in the future will affect value per share 
by increasing the number of shares outstanding in future periods.  
• The simplest way of thinking about this expected dilution is to consider the terminal 
value in the discounted cash flow model. When valuing a company, the terminal 
value is estimated at a point in time in the future, is discounted to the present and is 
then divided by the shares outstanding today to arrive at the value per share. 
However, expected option issues in the future will increase the number of shares 
outstanding in the terminal year, and therefore reduce the portion of the terminal 
value that belongs to existing equity investors.  
• An alternate way of considering why future option grants affect value is to treat them 
as employee compensation. The resulting increase in operating expenses will 
decrease operating income and after-tax cash flows in future years, thus reducing the 
value that we would attach to the firm today. 
Ways of incorporating future options into discounted cash flow value 
 It is much more difficult to incorporate the effect of expected option issues into 
value than existing options. This is because we have to forecast not only how many 
options will be issued by a firm in future periods, but also what the terms of these options 
will be. While this may be possible for a couple of periods with proprietary information 
(where the firm lets us know how much it plans to issue and at what terms), it will 
become more difficult beyond that point. We will consider an approach which we can use 
to obtain an estimate of the option value, and look at two ways of dealing with this 
estimate, once obtained. 
 38 
a. Estimate option value as an operating or capital expense 
We can estimate the value of options that will be granted in future periods as a 
percentage of revenues or operating income. By doing so, we can avoid having to 
estimate the number and terms of future option issues. Estimation will also become easier 
since we can draw on the firm’s own history (by looking at the value of option grants in 
previous years as a proportion of revenues or operating expenses) and the experiences of 
more mature firms in the sector. Generally, as firms become larger, the value of options 
granted as a percent of revenues should become smaller.  
Having estimated the value of expected future option issues, we are left with another 
question. Should we consider this value each period as an operating expense and compute 
the operating income, after the expense? If we do, we are assuming, then, that option 
issues form part of annual compensation. Alternatively, we can treat it as a capital 
expense and amortize it over multiple periods. While the cash flow in the current period 
is unaffected by this distinction, it has consequences for the return on capital and 
reinvestment rates that we measure for a firm. 
It is important that we do not double count future option issues. The current operating 
expenses of the firm may already incorporate the expense of employee options in one of 
two ways.  
• If the firm is expensing option at fair market value at grant time, the current 
earnings will reflect the value of the option grant in the most recent year. If we 
forecast future earnings, based upon this current income, we are implicitly 
assuming that the firm will not only continue to grant options in the future but 
also that the value of option grants will remain at the current period’s proportion 
of revenues. 
•  If the firm is not expensing options, the current earnings of the firm may already 
include the expenses associated with option exercises in the current period. If the 
effect on operating income of option exercise in the current period is less than the 
expected value of new option issues, we have to allow for an additional expense 
associated with option issues. Conversely, if a disproportionately large number of 
options were exercised in the last period, we have to reduce the operating 
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expenses to allow for the fact that the expected effect of option issues in future 
periods will be smaller. 
In making forecasts of future option issues, it is important to also consider the effects of 
the changing size of the firm on option issues. As firms become larger, the option grants 
as a percent of revenues or value will tend to become smaller. Thus, we should move 
option grants for firms towards industry averages or mature firm practices as we forecast 
out further into the future.  
Illustration 5: Valuing with expected option issues 
When valuing Cisco and Google, the current operating income of the companies and 
the industry averages were key inputs. The way the two firms have dealt with employee 
option expenses will play a key role in what operating income we will use in valuation. 
With Cisco, the stated pre-tax operating income for the most recent year is $7,416 
million. The firm, however, neither expenses employee options granted in the current 
year nor does it show the cost of option exercise in its earnings. Instead, it adjusts for the 
latter in the book value of equity. Consequently, the entire cost of the option grant for this 
year, valued at fair market value, should be netted out against the pre-tax operating 
income to arrive at a more reasonable measure of operating income: 
Stated Pre-tax Operating Income =   $7,416 million 
+ Expenses from option exercise considered   $       0 million 
- Fair market value of options granted during year $1,628 million 
Adjusted Pre-tax Operating income   $5,786 million 
If we use this pre-tax operating income as our base for forecasting future operating 
income, we are assuming that employee option grants will continue into the future and 
that the value of these grants as a percent of revenues will remain at this year’s level of 
6.56%. Since this is high, relative to the peer group (where the average option grants as a 
percent of value is closer to 3%), we assumed that option grants as a percent of revenues 
will decrease from existing levels to 3% over the next 10 years.27 More importantly, 
failing to adjust the operating income for employee option expenses will result in income, 
                                                
27 To do this, we have to make separate forecasts of the stated pre-tax operating income and employee 
option expenses, with the latter defined as a percent of revenues each year.  
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cash flows and value all being overstated. In fact, the value of equity would be overstated 
by almost $ 24 billion if we used the stated operating income for our calculations. 
Google, on the other hand, reported $ 1,433 million in pre-tax operating income for 
the four quarters ended June 30, 2005. Like Cisco, it does not expense employee option 
grants in the current year but unlike Cisco, it does show the expenses of option exercise 
as an operating expense. The adjustment to get to the correct operating income is 
therefore a little more complicated: 
Stated Pre-tax Operating Income =   $ 1,433 million 
+ Expenses from option exercise considered   $    264 million 
- Fair market value of options granted during year $    286 million 
Adjusted Pre-tax Operating income   $ 1,455 million 
The value of option grants as a percent of revenues in the most recent year is 6.39%. As 
with Cisco, we lower this value to 3% over the next 10 years, reflecting our expectation 
that as the firm grows, its option grants will become a smaller percent of revenues. This 
reduction, in turn, will push up operating margins in future years. 
The adjustments that we had to make to get to the corrected operating income for 
Cisco and Google provide a measure of how difficult it is to make these adjustments for 
all companies, at least until FAS 123R creates some uniformity in practices across 
companies. In 2005, for instance, some firms were already expensing employee options 
and others were not. Among the firms that did not expense options, some firms showed 
the expenses associated with options being exercised as operating expenses (like Google) 
whereas others (like Cisco) showed it as adjustments to book value of equity. The 
adjustments therefore vary from company to company and we are largely dependent upon 
the pro-forma adjustments that all companies are required to show for employee option 
expenses. The biggest benefit of forcing all companies to follow one rule and expense 
options (FAS 123R) is that we will be able to compare operating margins across 
companies (or average them) without having to worry about comparing pre-employee 
option expense margins for some companies to post-employee option expense margins 
for other companies. 
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b. Estimate expected stock price dilution from option issues 
 The other way of dealing with expected option grants in the future is to build in 
the expected dilution that will result from these option issues. To do this, we have to 
make a simplifying assumption. For instance, we could assume that options issued will 
represent a fixed percent of the outstanding stock each period, and base this estimate on 
the firm’s history or on the experience of more mature firms in the sector. Generally, this 
approach is more complicated than the first one and it does not lead to a more precise 
estimate of value. Clearly, it would be inappropriate to do both – show option issues as an 
expense and allow for the dilution that will occur from the issue. That double counts the 
same cost. 
Does the market value employee options correctly? 
 The debate about how best to incorporate employee options into estimates of 
value becomes academic if the market consistently fails to account for them when 
valuing equity per share in companies. In fact, there are many analysts who argue that 
being sloppy about employee options in either discounted cash flow or relative valuation 
creates little in costs because the market is also sloppy in its assessments. There are three 
dimensions on which we can consider how markets view employee options: How do 
markets react when options are granted to employees? How do markets react when 
employees exercise their options? Does the market incorporate the option overhang when 
valuing equity in a publicly traded company? The evidence on each question is presented 
below: 
1. Price reaction to option grant: There is no evidence that the market reacts negatively to 
option grants by companies. There are some who believe that this is because companies 
have historically not shown these option grants as expenses, but there is no reason to 
believe that option grants themselves are bad news for stockholders. In fact, if we view 
option grants as compensation, they are part of the normal cost of doing business for a 
young firm with a cash flow problem.  Consequently, news of option grants by 
themselves should be neither good nor bad news to markets. 
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2. Price reaction to option exercise: Garvey and Milbourn (2002) examine how stock 
prices react to the dilution that is caused when options are exercised.28 They argue that in 
an efficient market that incorporates the potential dilution from option exercise, the actual 
exercise should be a non-event with no stock price consequences. What they find, 
however, is that stock prices react negatively to option-exercise associated dilution, 
which they see as evidence that markets do not fully incorporate the option overhang. 
This may not necessarily be true, since option exercise, by itself, convey information to 
the market. In particular, a large number of option exercises by employees can be viewed 
as a signal that they believe that the stock is overvalued.  
3. Market Value and Option overhang: Li and Wong (2004) examined the market 
valuation of companies with employee stock options.29 They find that the market price is 
in fact lower for companies with substantial overhang (by about 6%) and that adjusting 
for employee stock options in valuation yields values that are closer to the market prices. 
This can be viewed as evidence that markets do consider the value of outstanding options 
when valuing companies. 
This debate has become more intense with the potential shift in accounting rules 
in 2006, requiring companies to expense option grants at fair market value. Such 
expensing, it is argued, will catch the market by surprise and lead to significant valuation 
reassessments, at least at companies that have disproportionately large option grants. A 
study of companies that have switched to expensing in 2002 and 2003 suggests that these 
fears may be misplaced. In this study, companies that switched to expensing options 
experienced neither positive nor negative returns; in other words, the expensing, by itself, 
had no effect on value, which would imply that the valuations of these companies 
effectively incorporated the option expensing prior to it happening.30 
At the risk of oversimplifying the debate, we believe that there are ways in which 
we can resolve the differences between these studies. The studies that find that equity 
values incorporate the existence and potential dilution that will be caused by options are 
                                                
28 Garvey, G.T. and T.T. Milbourn, 2002, Do Stock Prices incorporate the Potential Dilution Effect of 
Employee Options?, Working Paper, SSRN. 
29 Li, F. and M.H.F. Wong, 2004, Employee Stock Options, Equity Valuation and the Valuation of Option 
Grants using a Warrant Pricing Model, Working Paper, SSRN. 
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generally right.  Most investors and analysts do consider employee options when valuing 
stocks but only in a very rough sense by using fully diluted earnings per share in making 
valuation judgments. The studies that find negative stock price reactions to option 
exercise are probably also right, at least for firms that have made disproportionately large 
option grants (relative to other companies in the sector) or at excessively favorable terms 
(vesting and exercise price). What are the implications for stock prices when all 
companies will have to expense option grants next year? Assuming that firms do not 
change their option granting behavior next year, the transparency of the expense 
associated with option grants will lead to reassessments of value of equity per share at 
some companies, with values per share increasing at companies that have lower option 
expenses than expected (given the industry standards) and decreasing at companies that 
have higher option expenses than expected. We would expect that many of the latter 
group, though, will reduce option grants to bring them closer to industry averages. The 
net result will be fewer employee option grants, more standardization of grants across 
companies in a sector and no large market impact when FAS 123R finally comes into 
effect. 
Consequences of Option Based Compensation 
 Earlier in this paper, we looked at the reasons behind the shift towards equity 
compensation in recent years., The granting of employee options, in addition to affecting 
earnings and value, also has implications for corporate financial policy. As we will see in 
this section, firms that use employee options extensively adopt very different investment, 
financing and dividend policies than firms that do not. While a significant portion of the 
differences can be attributed to the fact that option-granting firms tend to be younger, 
higher growth and higher risk firms, some of the differences can be attributed directly to 
the presence of employee options and their effects on management incentives. 
                                                                                                                                            
30 Semerdzhian, M., 2004, The Effects of Expensing Stock Options and A New Approach to the Valuation 
Problem, Working Paper, SSRN. 
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Investment Policy 
 Conventional corporate financial theory recommends that firms pick investments 
that have positive net present values but is generally agnostic about risk in projects. In 
other words, firms should accept both safe and risky projects with positive net present 
values, assuming of course that the discount rates used to analyze the projects 
incorporates the risk. If two projects have the same net present value, firms should be 
indifferent between them. When managers are rewarded primarily with options, we alter 
this balance. Since options are rendered more valuable by higher volatility, managers will 
prefer higher risk investments to safer investments. While this may not be a problem if 
the net present values on the investments are the same, it can become a problem when the 
safer investment with the higher net present value is rejected in favor of the riskier 
investment with a lower net present value. In effect, common stockholders in these firms 
are subsidizing option-holding managers. In practice, the bias towards higher risk can 
manifest itself in many ways: 
• Cash versus Real Investments: Cash invested in treasury bills and commercial paper 
is a zero net present value investment, but it is riskless. It is possible that managers 
will feel the urge to invest the cash in risky real projects (or acquisitions), even if 
these projects have negative net present value.  
• Risk Shifting: Over time, managers may move the firm towards riskier business 
mixes, even if it does not make economic sense. The loss in value may be offset by 
the gains on option holdings for managers. 
The empirical evidence on the interplay between the existence of management options 
and investment policy is mixed. Some studies seem to indicate that managers who are 
compensated with options actually take less risk because they have so much of their 
wealth tied to how well the firm is doing.  
Financing Policy 
 Building on the theme that option-holders gain when equity becomes more risky, 
we would anticipate more debt in firms with more options outstanding. Higher financial 
leverage increases the volatility in stock prices and should also increase equity value. 
There is one counter availing factor. As we noted earlier, the exercise of equity options 
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creates tax deductions for firms and reduces the effective tax rate for the near term. This 
may reduce the tax benefits from the use of debt. The net effect will determine whether 
debt ratios increase or decrease as a consequence. Graham, Land and Shackelford (2003) 
find that firms that issue employee options have little debt and argue that the tax savings 
from option expensing that these firms gain reduce the marginal tax rates and thus the 
potential benefits to borrowing.31 
Dividend Policy 
 The use of employee options can have significant consequences for both how 
much firms return to stockholders and the form of that return (dividends or stock 
buybacks). On the first issue, we would expect more cash to be returned to stockholders 
in firms with options than firms without these options; cash, after all, is a zero risk 
investment and makes options on the equity less valuable. On the second, we would 
anticipate that less of the cash will be paid out in dividends and more will be used for 
stock buybacks. Dividends, after all, reduce the stock price whereas an equivalent stock 
buyback reduces shares outstanding and may well life the stock price. 
 There is some evidence that firms with significant employee options outstanding 
are more likely to buy back stock than to pay dividends. Fenn and Liang (2002) note that 
dividend payouts tend to be lower at firms with employee options than at otherwise 
similar firms without these options.32 Kahle (2004) presents evidence that stock buybacks 
are more common when firms have large numbers of options outstanding, and suggests 
that the repurchases may be motivated by both the need to cover the exercise of these 
options and the desire to keep the stock price high.33 At the same time, financial markets 
react less positively to these buybacks, suggesting that they recognize the motives for the 
buybacks.  
                                                
31 Graham, J.R., M.H. Lang and D. A. Shackelford, 2004, Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes and 
Debt Policy, Journal of Finance. 
32 Fenn, George and Nellie Liang. 2001. Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives,  
Journal of Financial Economics. 60, pp. 45-72. Similar conclusions are arrived at in Lambert, Richard A., 
William Lanen, and David F. Larcker. 1989. Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 24:4, pp. 409-425. 
33 Kahle, K.M., 2004, When a buyback isn’t a buyback: Open Market Repurchases and Employee Options, 
Working Paper, SSRN. 
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The Bottom Line 
 Options and common stock may both be equity instruments but they have 
different characteristics. In particular, risk that can affect common stock values 
negatively can increase option values. This fundamental contrast can explain why firms 
should be cautious about jumping on the option compensation bandwagon. If the reasons 
for using options are reducing the gulf between managerial and stockholder interests and 
a cash shortage, using common stock (restricted or otherwise) will accomplish these 
objectives without the side costs of options. 
II. Restricted Stock 
 While options have claimed the lion’s share of the attention, when it comes to 
equity compensation, giving equity in firms is a practice that predates options by decades. 
Firms, private and public, have attracted employees by offering them equity stakes, in 
addition to conventional compensation. When shares are offered to employees, it is not 
surprising that there are restrictions often imposed on laying claim to these shares and 
trading them. These restricted stock issues have made a comeback in recent years as the 
abuses of employee options have come to light. In July 2003, Microsoft switched from 
using options to restricted stock, representing the most prominent example of this trend. 
Use of and Accounting for Restricted Stock 
 As with employee options, we will begin by looking at both the prevalence of 
restricted stock issues and the question of what types of companies are most likely to use 
restricted stock. We will also look at the typical restrictions that are built into these 
shares, and how accounting rules for restricted stock have evolved over time. 
Magnitude and Usage 
 There has been a clear shift away from employee options, especially since the 
announcement of FAS 123R, though the evidence is still anecdotal for the most part. A 
survey by Mercer, a consulting firm, in May 2004 noted that about two thirds of all firms 
surveyed had changed their equity compensation programs in response to the option 
expensing rule. Among the firms that had already instituted changes, 22% of firms had 
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reduced option-based compensation by 40% or more. Among the 36% of the firms that 
replaced employee options with another form of equity compensation, restricted stock 
was the most common choice. As an example, consider Amazon, a heavy user of 
employee options in the late 1990s. In 2001, Amazon granted 46.25 million options to 
employees but in 2002, but the number of options granted dropped to 3.045 million in 
2003 and to 226,000 in 2004. The number of restricted shares granted to employees rose 
to 2.9645 million in 2003 and 2.1 million in 2004 
 The switch to restricted stock is likely to continue and perhaps accelerate in the 
future as option expensing becomes a given, and the historical accounting bias (created 
by APB 25) towards employee options disappears. It is unlikely, though, that restricted 
stock will completely replace equity options. After all, there are some firms that will be 
still better served with option grants than restricted stock grants to managers. In 
particular, we should expect to see equity options still be the dominant choice for risky, 
high growth firms early in the life cycle, trying to induce employees to bet on future 
growth. As firms move through the life cycle and become a little more mature, we would 
expect to see a shift towards restricted stock, as both volatility and growth flag. 
Characteristics of Restricted Stock and Variants 
 Restricted stock plans generally come with two constraints. The first relates to 
whether the employee stays with the firm. In most cases, the restricted stock is forfeited if 
the employee terminates employment. The second relates to trading on the stock. 
Generally, restricted stock cannot be traded until the end of the restriction period. These 
two conditions should make restricted stock less valuable than unrestricted stock.  A 
variation of restricted stock is phantom stock. With phantom stock, the firm deposits 
hypothetical shares in an employee’s account. These shares become actual shares at the 
end of a specified period, if the employee remains with the firm. Effectively, there is little 
difference from a valuation perspective between restricted stock and phantom stock, 
though there may be accounting differences. A third variation is stock bonus plans, where 
the granting of shares is contingent on the firm reaching a specified operating target – 
doubling of revenues, 20% growth in net income etc.  
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Accounting for Restricted Stock 
 The accounting rules that govern restricted stock have remained relatively stable 
over time, unlike the rules for employee compensation. When a restricted stock issue is 
made, firms have to estimate the value of the restricted stock and treat it as a 
compensation cost. Like employee options, the value of the restricted stock is spread over 
the vesting period. For instance, a restricted stock grant with a four-year vesting period 
and an estimated value of $ 1 million will create an accounting expense of $ 250,000 
each year for the next four years. 
In making the estimation of the value of restricted stock, firms are allowed to 
factor in both the probability that the employee will forfeit (by leaving the company) and 
the illiquidity of the shares, and discount the observed market price. Quoting FASB: 
“Restricted securities are often purchased at a discount from the quoted price of 
otherwise identical unrestricted securities, reflecting the lack of liquidity relating 
to the inability to access that market for the specified period. Therefore, in 
estimating the fair value of restricted securities, the quoted price of an otherwise 
identical unrestricted security shall be adjusted for the effect of the restriction, 
considering factors such as the nature and duration of the restriction, the volatility 
of the unrestricted security, and the risk-free interest rate.”34 
FASB goes on to add that determining the discount requires the analyst’s judgment. 
Valuing Restricted Stock 
 As we noted earlier, there are generally three modifications to restricted stock that 
can affect value. The first is the employment restriction. Since restricted stock vest with 
the employee only if he or she remains employed by the firm, the greater the likelihood 
of employment termination, the less valuable restricted stock will become. Adjusting for 
this factor requires an estimate of the probability that an employee will stay employed by 
the firm during the restriction period, and multiplying that probability by the stock price 
today. 
                                                
34 FASB Financial Accounting Series, No 1201-100, June 23, 2004. 
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The most common version of restricted stock prevents employees from trading the 
stock for a specified number of years after they have been granted the stock. Thus, 
restricted stock is illiquid, relative to other stock, and should trade at a discount on the 
observed market price. How much of a discount? That will depend upon several factors: 
1. Period of illiquidity: The longer the non-trading restriction period, the larger the 
illiquidity discount should be for restricted stock. To provide a sense of the magnitude 
of the discount, note that firms that raise funds through the issue of restricted stock to 
investors (as opposed to using it as management compensation) typically accept 
discounts of 20-30% on the market price. 
2. Hedging/ Borrowing Constraints: Employees with restricted stock may very well be 
able to avoid the biggest costs of illiquidity if they can hedge against price 
movements (thus enabling them to lock in high stock prices on the restricted stock) 
and borrow against the estimated market value of the restricted stock. As the 
constraints on hedging and borrowing become tighter, the illiquidity discount 
attached to restricted stock should increase. 
3. Stock Volatility: The cost of illiquidity becomes much larger when the restricted 
stock is in a volatile company, since the stock price can swing wildly from period to 
period and employees can do little to protect themselves or cash out.  
The estimation of the illiquidity discount on restricted stock is far too detailed for this 
paper, but there is a companion paper that does deal with this issue.35 
 The third is a performance contingency. If the employee will receive the stock 
only if a performance condition is met (whether that condition be stated in terms of 
revenues or earnings), the value of the restricted stock will have to reflect the likelihood 
of this happening.  
Incorporating Restricted Stock into Valuation 
 Incorporating restricted stock into valuations is far easier than incorporating 
employee options, which should be an argument in favor of the use of restricted stock.  In 
                                                
35 Damodaran, A., 2005, Marketability and Value: Measuring the Illiquidity Discount, Working Paper, 
www.damodaran.com. 
 50 
this section, we will consider how best to consider restricted stock issues in both 
discounted cash flow and relative valuation. 
Discounted Cash flow Valuation 
 As with employee options, there are three dimensions along which restricted stock 
issues can affect value. Restricted stock issues in the past will create an overhang of 
restricted stock that can affect the value per non-restricted share. Restricted stock issues 
to compensate employees in the current year will reduce current earnings, because they 
are compensation expenses. Expected restricted stock issues in the future will reduce 
future earnings and cash flows.  
• Restricted Stock Issues in the past: Restricted stock issues in the past will be reflected 
in the number of shares outstanding at a firm at any point in time. Thus, assume that a 
firm that has issued 20 million restricted stock issues over the last 5 years and that 
they remain restricted. In addition, assume that this firm has 80 million unrestricted 
shares trading in the market today as conventional shares. The firm will report having 
100 million shares outstanding, but the shares are not equivalent. In particular, as we 
noted in the last section, restricted shares should be less valuable than unrestricted 
shares. Thus, if the overall value of equity is $ 1 billion, the restricted shares should 
have values less than $ 10 and the unrestricted shares should have values greater than 
$ 10. 
• Restricted Stock Issues in the current year: The arguments we used for treating 
employee options as compensation expense apply just as strongly for restricted stock. 
Thus, the value of restricted stock (allowing for the illiquidity discount) granted in the 
current year to employees should be treated as an operating expense and reduce the 
current year’s operating and net income.  
• Expected Restricted Stock Issues in the future: Expected restricted stock issues in the 
future are an operating expense line item. As with options, the best way to estimate 
the line item is to compute the value of restricted stock granted each year as a percent 
of revenues historically and then forecast out this value for future years. This will 
reduce expected future cash flows and, by extension, the value per share today. 
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In summary, the treatment of restricted stock issues mirrors the treatment of employee 
options with the one obvious qualifier. There are fewer valuation issues related to valuing 
restricted stock than options, at least for publicly traded firms. The only real debate is 
about the size of the illiquidity discount to be attached to the stock price. 
Relative Valuation 
 Since accountants have typically adjusted the number of shares outstanding for 
restricted stock outstanding, analysts have generally had an easier time incorporating the 
effect of restricted stock into relative valuation. The one potential problem that is often 
overlooked is that restricted shares add to the share count just like regular shares but they 
should have lower values (because of illiquidity). As a consequence, we are likely to 
overstate all multiples for firms with substantial restricted stock outstanding. To see why, 
note that any multiple (equity or enterprise value) has the market capitalization as one of 
the ingredients in the numerator. The conventional computation of market capitalization 
involves multiplying the number of shares outstanding by the observed market price. 
Since restricted stock should have lower values, the market capitalization will be 
overstated for companies with significant restricted stock overhang. As an example, 
consider the firm with 80 million regular shares and 20 million restricted shares, and 
assume that the stock price is $10.15 (for the traded shares). Multiplying the market price 
($10.15) by the number of shares outstanding (100 million) will generate a market 
capitalization of $1.015 billion. In reality, though, the 20 million restricted shares would 
have traded at a discount (if they had traded) and the cumulative market cap would have 
been lower (say $ 1 billion)  
 Notwithstanding this problem, restricted stock is less likely to skew relative 
valuations than employee options, because restricted stock overhangs tend to be small 
(relative to option overhangs) and the illiquidity discount is small (again relative to the 
variability in option values). 
Conclusion 
 The use of equity as employee compensation is not new. Firms have always used 
equity grants as sweeteners not only to attract managers to their firms but to also make 
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them think like stockholders. In the last two decades, the floodgates have opened on 
equity compensation, especially at technology firms. At many of these firms, managers 
were rewarded primarily through options, aided by the lax accounting and tax treatment 
of these grants (by not expensing them until exercise). In the last few years, the 
awareness of employee options has been raised by two developments. The first is the 
recognition that some managers were receiving wildly disproportionate rewards for any 
efforts that they were putting in, with options packages valued in tens of millions of 
dollars. The second was the belated acceptance by accounting standards boards that 
employee options are compensation and that they should be valued and expensed at the 
time of the grant (and not at exercise).  
Questions have come with this awareness: How do we value employee options? 
How do they affect the intrinsic (discounted cash flow) value of a firm? How can we 
compare multiples of earnings or book value across companies with widely divergent 
policies on the use of employee options? In this paper, we have developed answers to 
these and other questions. In particular, employee option grants affect value per share 
because they affect current and future earnings and also because they have the potential 
for altering the number of shares outstanding.  
In the final part of the paper, we looked at the re-emergence of restricted stock 
and how best to deal with its use in valuing a company. Restricted stock should generally 
be valued lower than other stock because of their illiquidity. Like options, they affect 
value per share. 
 
 
 
                                                
